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Abstract   
Institutional investors face different types of leverage and short-sale restrictions that 
alter competition in the asset management industry. This distortion enables high-risk 
unconstrained investors (e.g., equity long/short hedge fund managers) to extract 
additional income from constrained institutional investors. Using a sample of 1,938 
long/short equity hedge funds spanning 15 years, we show that high-volatility funds 
deliver lower net-of-fees Sharpe ratios than do their low-volatility peers; furthermore, 
the managers of these funds usually charge higher fees. This evidence can be 
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Leverage and short sale restrictions imposed on investors challenge the premise of the 
Markowitz’s (1952) Modern Portfolio Theory and, more specifically, Tobin’s (1958) 
two-fund separation theorem, which underlies the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM). Within that framework, every investor should freely access the unrestricted 
market portfolio (possibly with short positions in some securities, as shown by Ross 
(1977)) and then leverage it according to her own risk preference. An individual 
investor’s homemade leverage or short sale of securities, although theoretically easy 
to grasp, is not easily achieved under realistic borrowing constraints either through 
credit rationing or because of a lending spread (Sorensen et al. 2007; Baker et al. 
2011). Aversion to leverage or risk barriers might also prevent homemade portfolio 
construction (Jacobs and Levy, 2012). As a consequence, many individual investors 
who wish to build a high-risk/high-expected return-portfolio cannot achieve it on their 
own. In this context, the availability of the mutual or hedge funds offered by 
institutional asset managers represents a valuable alternative. 
Even in the institutional investors’ world, however, not everyone receives equal 
treatment regarding investment restrictions. Baker, Bradley and Wurgler (2011) show 
that investors such as those of pension funds or mutual funds are generally reluctant 
to inflate their risk levels by shorting stocks and increasing leverage. These authors 
hypothetically relate such behavior to borrowing and trading costs, tight tracking error 
and the benchmarking constraints that they must meet. Nevertheless, actors exist, 
mostly in the alternative investment universe, who are much less exposed, if at all, to 
portfolio construction constraints. Through securities shorting and gearing, these 
actors can build risky portfolios that are otherwise inaccessible to their peers. Thus, in 
risk-return terms, they can achieve Sharpe ratios that restricted investors cannot reach. 
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Institutional investors who suffer from leverage constraints might therefore turn to 
alternative investments such as hedge funds to allocate part of their investments in a 
levered and less constrained “satellite”. In fact, Jank and Smajbegovic (2015) indicate 
that hedge fund asset managers (who are the least constrained investors) “bet against 
beta (BAB)” and demonstrate a significant positive exposure to the BAB factor of 
Frazzini and Pedersen (2014). This explanation attributes hedge funds’ superior 
performance to their active short selling of high-beta stocks.  
The above findings raise a legitimate, pragmatic question: If some investors have an 
appetite for high-risk portfolios, and if only a subset of institutional asset managers, 
mostly those investing in hedge funds, can deliver performance superior to all others, 
then do these hedge fund managers keep the extra returns for themselves, or do they 
share it with their clients? This question is the major topic of this article. 
In a similar fashion to what is commonly observed with regard to stock and bond 
returns, we show that the leverage restrictions of institutional investors create a 
volatility anomaly in the net-of-fee equity of long/short funds. However, we go one 
step further by associating, at least partly, this anomaly with the practice of hedge 
fund asset managers who inflate their fees with their risk level. Thus, the source of the 
anomaly does not lie in the advantage of managing a low risk portfolio. Rather, it is 
the disadvantage of some investors who are searching for optimal high-risk portfolios 
under constraints that creates the distortion in realized net performance. 
Two types of explanations exist that are not mutually exclusive for this curbed 
relationship between net-of-fee equity long/short funds’ Sharpe ratios and volatilities. 
Realizing that they enjoy a privileged position, hedge fund managers might 
voluntarily not transfer as much performance to their investors as they would under a 
perfectly competitive framework. Because of their restrictions, most investors cannot 
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apply arbitrage to this anomaly, and they have no effective defense against this 
behavior.  
Another explanation is related to the remuneration of the service delivered by hedge 
funds beyond their ability to generate alpha. In fact, short selling restrictions have 
important consequences for the asset management industry. Boehmer and Wu (2013) 
use high-frequency data to demonstrate the important role played by short sellers in 
the price discovery process and informational efficiency in financial markets. 
Sorensen et al. (2007) show that short selling constraints lead to sub-optimal asset 
allocation and higher idiosyncratic risk. Clarke et al. (2002) use a simulation analysis 
to estimate the cost induced by short selling restrictions. Jacobs and Levy (2007, 
2013) demonstrate the importance of short selling in active portfolio management and 
the need to account for leverage risk aversion in a mean-variance portfolio 
optimization. Recent literature has shown that such a constrained and sub-optimal 
situation might create a low volatility anomaly where safer assets tend to outperform 
on a risk-adjusted return basis (Asness, Frazzini and Pedersen, 2012). If this 
explanation held true, then part of a hedge fund manager’s fee would represent a form 
of compensation for her contribution to the well-functioning of the asset management 
industry.  
Both interpretations, either the extraction of a situational rent or the compensation for 
enhancing the functioning of markets, are valid. Regardless of which one prevails, 
however, the evidence of a clear link between long/short equity hedge fund risk levels 
and net-of-fee Sharpe ratios has deep implications regarding the functioning of the 
asset management industry. First, this link contributes to the resolution of the low 
volatility puzzle by associating the lower performance of riskier investment strategies, 
at least in part, with the performance rent captured by the least constrained investors. 
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From this point of view, we should talk about a “high volatility anomaly”. Second, it 
suggests that the borrowing and short sales restrictions imposed (internally or 
externally) on asset managers restrain competition. Such restrictions lead to transfer 
value to actors who can escape them. The extra fee of high-risk funds is not entirely 
returned to shareholders. Less tight benchmarking, wider mandates regarding risk 
budgets, and more flexible regulations might contribute to improving the competitive 
landscape at the benefit of individual investors, to whom a larger fraction of the fund 
performance could be returned. 
 
A framework for understanding long/short hedge fund performance 
Background 
In the context of Markowitz’s (1952) Modern Portfolio Theory, the total risk of each 
portfolio is measured by the standard deviation (volatility) of returns, and the 
expected return reflects the portfolio value creation. Using this risk-expected return 
framework, the efficient frontier represents the concave and increasing curve, plotting 
each combination of assets that cannot be simultaneously dominated by any other on 
both the risk and return dimensions. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of 
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) assumes that every rational and 
risk-averse investor invests along a tangent line of the efficient frontier whose 
intercept is the risk-free rate. The tangency portfolio is called the market portfolio. To 
reach a portfolio with higher volatility, investors should apply leverage to this market 
portfolio rather than overweighting their portfolio with high-volatility stocks. This 
two-fund separation theorem, a fundamental result derived by Tobin (1958), 
dissociates the investment decision (i.e., acquisition of the market portfolio) from the 
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financing decision by combining this market portfolio with the riskless asset. Such a 
result entails a linear relation between volatility and the expected return of portfolios 
held at equilibrium, whose equation is given by the Capital Market Line (CML). 
Consequently, every optimal portfolio located along the CML has the same reward-
to-variability ratio (i.e., the slope of the CML).  
For the two-fund separation theorem to hold for every investor, one key assumption 
underlying the CAPM must be met: the investor’s ability to lend and borrow without 
limitation at the same risk-free interest rate. Blume and Friend (1973) show that an 
investor with a higher borrowing than lending rate only has access to a curvilinear 
mean-variance space, and several efficient portfolios can be held at equilibrium. For 
such a constrained investor, the CML is not unique. Two portfolios can be 
distinguished: one that involves lending (at a low loan rate) and one that involves 
borrowing (at a higher funding cost). The former delivers a superior risk-to-variability 
ratio than the latter. Ex-post, this will also lead to higher average Sharpe ratios when 
they are measured with realized returns. 
Despite this natural and intuitive result, Brennan (1971) claims that “one is inclined to 
wonder whether this curvilinearity could not be arbitraged by a few privileged 
investors with borrowing rates equal to the lending rate” (p. 1198). He shows that 
when different investors have different borrowing and lending rates (thus some being 
favored over others), a version of the CAPM still holds. The equilibrium expected 
rates of return of securities are linear functions of the return of a single value-
weighted portfolio. The asset pricing equation that he obtains is similar to Black’s 
(1972) so-called “zero-beta” version of the model. 
Brennan’s point about equilibrium rates of returns is important: the CAPM still holds 
in this context. This is confirmed by Black (1972), who shows that low-beta assets 
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outperform high-beta assets on a risk-adjusted basis. His findings lend support to his 
(and, thus, Brennan’s) version of the model. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) find similar 
evidence in the bond markets as well as international stock markets. At the same time, 
the equilibrium relation coexists with the fact that restricted investors do not have 
access to the same equilibrium portfolios as the unconstrained investors.  
This dive into the history of finance research underlines a portfolio management issue 
that is alive and well. According to Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), leverage 
restrictions explain why investors tend to overweight high volatility stocks to achieve 
a target high risk-return tradeoff. The consequences are twofold. First, it explains the 
so-called low volatility anomaly and the tendency to favor risk parity strategies to 
redefine the tangent portfolio (Asness, Frazzini and Pedersen, 2012) exactly as 
anticipated by Brennan. Second, it suggests that in general, unsophisticated or 
financially constrained investors can only achieve an overall lower efficient frontier 
and a flatter CML than would be reachable when applying unrestricted leverage. The 
consequence is the emergence of arbitrage opportunities between low and high 
volatility stocks (Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014). 
However, this discussion does not explain what occurs on the high end of the risk 
spectrum. Some people, despite the difficulty of achieving attractive reward-to-
variability ratios, might still wish to trade off a high level of risk in exchange for the 
promise of a high expected return. After all, individual investors’ risk profiles are 
heterogeneous, and many have a particularly high tolerance for risk, a particularly 
long investment horizon, or both. They desire for aggressive portfolio allocations, and 
might want to mandate professional asset managers to satisfy their objectives. What 
is, for them, the consequence of the coexistence of different sets of constraints in the 




The theoretical background suggests that a financial market in which investors have 
unequal access to leverage potentially enables the most unconstrained investors to 
extract a rent from their funding advantage. We now translate this argument from a 
practical point of view into the context of the institutional asset management 
landscape. 
The market for financial securities features three categories of investors. For the sake 
of simplicity, “unsophisticated personal investors” (henceforth UPIs) are fully 
constrained individuals in that they have neither access to short selling nor unlimited 
leverage at a reasonable cost (i.e., the risk-free rate).  
At the other extreme, “sophisticated institutional investors” (SIIs) are fully 
unconstrained institutional asset managers. Here, we make a clear association with 
hedge funds, and in particular with their largest category (by historical standards): 
long/short equity hedge funds. In general, their managers’ strategy lies in their 
superior ability to access any combination of long, short, and leveraged stock 
positions under the risk-return framework. Allocating long/short hedge fund managers 
to the category of sophisticated institutional investors is therefore a natural choice, 
and the fact that it represents a homogenous group is helpful from an empirical 
perspective. 
Finally, "unsophisticated institutional investors” (UIIs) such as insurers, pension 
funds or mutual funds are somewhere in the middle between UPIs and SIIs. For this 
type of investor, gearing and short-sales constraints are less severe because of their 
easier access to financial markets than UPIs; however, they do not have the same 
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investment possibilities because of mandate or regulatory restrictions as SIIs. They 
offer asset management products that are “unsophisticated”, not because of any lack 
of skill or expertise but because their mission is to propose portfolios whose 
construction involves a limited degree of complexity to investors who are themselves 
mostly non-sophisticated (e.g., retail investors).  
To keep this argument simple, all investors have access to homogenous information, 
and they are mean-variance rational risk averters. Institutional investors act as the 
agents of the individuals, with a contract whose remuneration is their management 
(and, if applicable, their performance) fee. Consistent with the CAPM, they attempt to 
select the portfolio achieving the best possible Sharpe ratio, regardless of its volatility 
level, because they can freely wander along the CML. By contrast, personal investors 
aim to maximize their expected utility consistent with their risk-tolerance level. To do 
so, they must choose between entering the agency relation or performing homemade 
(constrained) risk-return optimization with different lending and borrowing rates.i 
 
Performance sharing under the constrained CAPM 
Long/short equity hedge fund managers can shift the efficient frontier to the left by 
combining long and short positions (i.e., implementing double alpha strategies). Jank 
and Smajlbegovic (2015) showed that hedge fund managers, as the least constrained 
investors, “bet against beta” and short sell high-beta stocks. Because they can directly 
offer high volatility portfolios to individuals with low-risk aversion, they compete 
with constrained institutional asset managers and individuals on the high-risk 
segment. Their greater access to leverage through better gearing possibilities and 
unrestricted short sales grants them the possibility to increase their fees to the point 
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where their net-of-fee Sharpe ratio equals that of their competitors. The arbitrage 
profit that they can extract is represented in Figure 1. 
< Insert Figure 1 > 
Figure 1 illustrates the shortfall of the Sharpe ratio achieved by UPIs, who are the 
fully constrained long-only investors. Their mean-variance efficient frontier lies 
below that of the fully unrestricted SII, and their CML is flatter on the upper portion 
because of higher borrowing costs versus the leveraged (dotted) portion of the straight 
line that continues the long-only CML, starting from the risk-free rate (Friend and 
Blume, 1973). The advantageous situation of the equity long/short hedge fund 
managers (belonging to the SII group) over UPIs entails that their net-of-fee Sharpe 
ratio exceeds one of the long-only efficient frontiers. This implication is the first 
testable aspect of our framework.  
Next, consider UIIs. These are the investors who are in the middle of the asset 
management spectrum. They comply with a mandate that is much narrower than that 
of hedge fund managers. In terms of investment opportunities, this translates into two 
limitations. First, it is impossible for them to obtain full access to short sales. We 
should therefore locate their opportunity set somewhere between the long-only and 
the long/short efficient frontier. Second, although they can leverage their portfolio to 
a certain extent, they face restrictions (e.g., borrowing cap and growing interest rates) 
that progressively reduce their risk-return trade-off with the level of portfolio risk, 
leading the relation between expected returns and volatility to become increasingly 
concave rather than linear. The constraints faced by UIIs with regard to short sales 
and gearing restrict their achievable performance to the constrained long/short Capital 
Market Curve (CMC) depicted in Figure 2.  
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< Insert Figure 2 > 
Because they compete with traditional asset managers from the mutual fund industry, 
hedge fund managers have no incentive to transfer the full performance of highly 
volatile funds to their investors. If no leverage or short sales restrictions existed, then 
low and high volatility funds should deliver the same Sharpe ratio just by moving 
along the efficient line. Although a constant Sharpe-volatility relation might hold at 
the gross returns level, the constraints placed on UIIs permit hedge fund managers to 
charge higher fees. This effect induces a negative relation between the net-of-fees 
Sharpe ratios offered to final investors and the level of volatility achieved by the fund.  
A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 reveals an a priori undetermined comparison 
between the slopes of the unconstrained long-only CML (Figure 1) and the 
constrained long/short CMC (Figure 2). When volatility becomes large, the 
constraints affecting the high-risk mutual funds of UIIs might be so strict that they 
make it impossible for them to beat even the leveraged market portfolio. As such, the 
unconstrained long/short funds of SIIs might stand in a position to charge even higher 
fees beyond a certain volatility level. Given this reasoning, fund managers who take 
higher risks can charge higher fees. Thus, not only is the relation between the fund’s 
risk and its net-of-fee (risk-adjusted) performance likely to decrease, but it is also 
presumably concave. This negative and concave relation between net performance 
and volatility is the second testable implication of our framework. 
Eventually, our story entails that we find an associated positive relationship between a 
hedge fund’s volatility and its level of fees. Taken in isolation, the positive 
relationship between volatility and management, performance, or both types of fees 
does not represent evidence per se of a rent extraction mechanism. For instance, this 
effect might be explained by the fair compensation for higher operational risks 
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induced by higher leverage or by the larger cost of risk management for highly 
leveraged funds. However, it would then go along with a concomitantly higher gross 
performance that justifies the cost or the risk premium. By contrast, if we also find a 
relation between volatility that is simultaneously negative with the net-of-fee Sharpe 
ratio and positive with the fee level of hedge funds, then it is unlikely to be a 
coincidence. This finding would represent, in our view, substantive evidence of a 
voluntary shift in the sharing of gross performance between SII hedge fund managers 
and USI individuals to the benefit of the former. 
To summarize, the hypothesis that high-risk, fully unconstrained equity long/short 
hedge fund managers extract a rent from their favorable situation will be supported if 
we observe three phenomena simultaneously:  
• Their net-of-fees Sharpe ratios are higher than those of long-only portfolios  
• Their net-of-fees Sharpe ratios decrease (more than proportionally) with their 
volatilities 
• Their management, performance, or both types of fees increase with their 
volatilities 
The next section offers empirical evidence to support our conjectures. 
 
Empirical evidence regarding individual funds 
Data  
We use data for individual hedge funds between March 1997 and October 2012 from 
Lipper Tass. We require the funds to report their performance over at least 36 months, 
with a minimum of 2 reporting Net Asset Value (NAV), i.e., at least one return. From 
3,911 funds, we eliminate 1,171 without sufficient data to perform the analysis. Our 
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final sample includes 1,938 hedge funds, after further excluding funds that did not 
report USD net-of-fees NAV from the analysis. Data on the market portfolio (denoted 
M) were retrieved from K. French’s data library. 
< Insert Table 1 > 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for the defined variables. Each variable is 
measured at time ! on a window of 36 lagged observations, leading to a panel size of 
1,938 hedge funds x 152 three-year windows = 294,576 potential observations. 
< Insert Table 2 > 
Table 2 shows a strong enhancement effect (provided by long/short equity funds) over 
the Sharpe ratios of long-only investments. Although the Sharpe ratio and the 
volatility of the benchmark are stable over this period, these measures vary strongly 
for the individual hedge funds included in our sample. The distribution of the 
individual Sharpe ratio over time is skewed to the left with occurrences of poor 
Sharpe ratio values. Management fees and performance fees range by 100 and 200 
basis points, respectively, across time and funds. 
 
Long/short equity vs. long-only Sharpe ratios 
To examine whether individual long/short equity hedge funds significantly 
outperformed the long-only efficient frontier across time, we carry out a linear 
regression (without an intercept) of the estimated Sharpe ratios for each of the 1,938 
funds against the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio: 
 !!,! =  !!!!!,! + !!,!     (1) 
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where !!,! = an error term for the individual fund j at month t. The risk-free rate 
corresponds to the 1-month T-Bill return from Ibbotson and Associates, Inc., as 
downloaded from French’s data library.  
We observe that the “Sharpe ratio multiplier” (coefficient !!!) is significantly positive 
for 1,116 funds (out of 1,938) but significantly negative for only 218. Figure 3 shows 
the distribution of funds according to the level of the Sharpe multiplier. The multiplier 
is standardized because it corresponds to the t-stat of the coefficient on the 
benchmark's Sharpe ratio in equation (1). 
< Insert Figure 3 > 
The histogram of the Sharpe multiplier is right-skewed, which confirms the leverage 
effect of the Sharpe ratio for the large number of individual funds. However, the 
average cross-sectional coefficient among the 1,938 funds is equal to 2.93 with a t-stat 
of 1.49, which is not significant at the usual confidence threshold. Thus, Figure 3 
suggests that although the number of outperforming funds is much larger than that of 
underperforming funds, the magnitude of this outperformance is not overwhelming.  
 
Long/short equity Sharpe ratios and volatilities 
The mixed support that we find for equation (1) calls for further investigation. From a 
performance sharing perspective, the superiority of their riskier investment set enables 
SIIs to extract a higher rent from their position, thereby reducing their net-of-fee 
Sharpe ratio. As such, we include the funds’ and market risk levels in the analysis by 
extending the linear regression of equation (1) to include the following volatility 
levels: 
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!!,! =  !!!!!,! + !!!!!,! + !′!!!!,! + !!,!   (2) 
To support our conjecture of an inverse relation between fund volatility and 
performance, we expect !!! to be negative. Applying equation (2) to individual 
long/short equity fund data, we show that the relation between a fund’s Sharpe ratio 
and its return volatility is significantly negative for 857 funds but significantly 
positive for 412 funds. Figure 4 illustrates the left-skewed distribution of the Sharpe-
volatility relation.  
< Insert Figure 4 > 
The average cross-sectional coefficient among the 1,938 funds is equal to -1.92, with 
a t-stat of -11.99. Evidence strongly supports a negative relation between individual 
funds’ Sharpe ratios and their volatility across time.ii 
 
Fund fees and volatility 
The third piece of evidence that would support the performance sharing hypothesis is 
the direct positive connection between fee levels and volatilities. This effect is simply 
measured on a fund-by-fund basis using equations (3) (for performance fees) and (4) 
(for management fees):  
 !"##!,! =  !!!!!,! + !!,!    (3) !"##!,! =  !′!!!!,! + !!,!    (4) 
A positive coefficient for equation (3) would be particularly in line with our 
explanation of rent extraction because the performance fee measures a fraction of the 
excess return over the hurdle rate, regardless of its level or the riskiness of the fund. 
However, equation (4) might also reveal that the manager artificially inflates her fixed 
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fee level in addition to the variable rate as a way to “spread” the rent throughout both 
components of the remuneration. The evidence of a simultaneous positive effect of 
volatility on both the performance and management fees is consistent with the 
manager’s attitude of deliberately raising her share of performance more 
proportionally than her efforts to generate it. 
The relation between performance fees and volatility is positive among 469 of the 
1,938 funds (compared with 203 funds showing a negative relation). Figure 5 shows 
the slight positive skewed distribution of the relation between volatility and 
performance fee.  
< Insert Figure 5 > 
The average cross-sectional coefficient among the 1,938 funds is equal to 0.738, with 
a t-stat of 11.63, which supports a strong positive relation between performance fee 
and volatility. 
The relation between management fees and volatility is significantly positive among 
544 of the 1,938 funds (compared with 270 funds showing a negative relation). Figure 
6 displays the slightly positive skewed distribution of the relation between volatility 
and management fees. The average cross-sectional coefficient among the 1,938 funds 
is equal to 0.858, with a t-stat of 9.90. Again, this result supports a strong positive 
relation between management fees and volatility. 





Aggregate evidence on panel data 
While fund-by-fund analysis enables us to detect relations that would be broadly 
shared across the market, the large heterogeneity of the funds in the sample does not 
allow us to draw systematic evidence at the market-wide level. We thus aggregate our 
data into a panel and perform fixed-effect regressions. Evidence obtained with such 
analysis would enable us to identify common effects that correspond to a global 
market phenomenon. 
Regarding the link between long/short equity and long-only Sharpe ratios, equation 
(1) remains essentially unchanged but with a single coefficient that applies for all 
funds:  
!!,! =  !!!!,! + !!,!     (5) 
As before, we can interpret coefficient !! in the regression as the “Sharpe ratio 
multiplier” (i.e., a multiplier of the long-only portfolio performance). 
Using the panel data, the treatment of the relation between long/short equity Sharpe 
ratios and volatilities differs from that performed with individual funds. Starting with 
equation (2), we obtain equation (6). Next, equation (7) adds a potentially nonlinear 
relation between the Sharpe ratio multiplier and the level of volatility:iii 
!!,! =  !!!!,!+ !!!!,! + !!,!    (6)	!!,! =  !!!!,!+ !!!!,! +  !′′!!!,!1!! !.!% + !!,!  (7)	
The last term of equation (7) introduces a dummy variable that equals 1 if the fund’s 
monthly volatility exceeds 1.4% and 0 otherwise. The volatility threshold is defined 
empirically (see below). This equation enables us to simultaneously test whether a 
fund’s Sharpe ratio decreases with volatility (coefficient  !!), and whether it does so 
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in a more pronounced way when the fund’s volatility becomes high (coefficient  !′!), 
as suggested in Figure 2. 
Finally, the tests for the positive relations between fee levels and volatilities are 
directly derived from equations (3) and (4) in the panel context: 
!"##!,! =   !!!!,! + !!,!    (8) !"##!,! =   !′!!!,! + !!,!    (9) 
Table 3 displays the results of panel equations (5) through (9), estimated with fixed 
effects. 
< Insert Table 3 > 
According to equation (5), equity long/short funds present an average performance 
multiplier of approximately 4 times the performance of the benchmark as measured 
by the Sharpe ratio. This finding broadly confirms the relevance of our framework. 
To gather more insight into the evolution of the Sharpe ratio multiplier with fund risk, 
we re-run equation (5) conditional with volatility breakpoints, starting with 
observations for which 1% < !!,!  ≤ 1.1%, then when 1.1% < !!,!  ≤ 1.2%,  and so on. 
Figure 7 illustrates the negative effect of volatility on the Sharpe multiplier.  
< Insert Figure 7 > 
The leveraged performance is high for low levels of volatility but vanishes as the 
volatility of the fund increased. A substantial drop is observed between 1.25 and 1.5% 
volatility, and an even greater one is observed between 1.5 and 1.75%. We observe a 
threshold in the Sharpe ratio multiplier equal to 4 for these levels of volatility. This 
finding suggests that the tendency of hedge fund managers to capture a higher share 
of performance is expected to be more pronounced above a certain threshold.  
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According to panel equation (6), there is a significant negative relation between the 
Sharpe ratio of a long/short fund and its volatility:  !! is significantly negative at the 
99% confidence level. However, the relation between the funds’ Sharpe ratio and 
their volatility is non-linear (concave; see Figure 8 below), where equation (6) is re-
estimated based on conditional volatility breakpoints. 
< Insert Figure 8 > 
Figure 5 shows a U-shaped relation between long/short equity hedge funds’ Sharpe 
ratios and their volatility levels. The negative link between net performance and risk 
is graphically supported for a level of volatility beyond 1.15%. Beyond this threshold, 
the relation becomes negative, although the amplitude of the negative relation 
between the performance of the fund (as measured via the Sharpe ratio) and its 
volatility decreases in absolute values for volatility levels above 1.4%.  
This observation of a U-shaped behavior explains why we use a threshold of !!,! = 1.4% for the binary variable in equation (7). The results of this regression, after 
controlling for fund volatility, clearly show a kinked relation in the Sharpe multiplier 
for levels of monthly volatility greater than 1.4%. The multiple of performance is the 
highest for volatility levels lower than this threshold at a level of 5.3x.  
Finally, fund managers’ tendency to increase their remuneration with risk level is 
confirmed using the coefficient estimates in equations (8) and (9). Thus, taken 
together, the evidence from the various panels shows that riskier funds deliver lower 




Conclusions: As in nature, finance abhors a vacuum  
Based on the seminal work regarding the CAPM with leverage restrictions, we 
conjectured in this paper that fund managers who are not subject to constraints on 
short sales or borrowing conditions (e.g., the majority of long/short equity hedge 
funds) are in a position to extract a "rent" from their investors. This rent becomes 
larger as the fund’s risk level rises, and it is extracted in the form of performance, 
management, or both types of fees. Without disregard for the low volatility puzzle 
emphasized in the literature, we uncover a “high volatility puzzle” in the asset 
management industry and provide a credible explanation for this effect. 
Our dataset of 1,938 funds provides clear support for a high volatility anomaly in 
long/short equity hedge funds. We relate this anomaly in after-fee returns to the 
institutional investors’ leverage restrictions and equity long/short managers' fee 
practices. Our empirical evidence shows that although equity long/short hedge fund 
managers offer to leverage the performance of traditional passive portfolios, they do 
not transfer the full added value of their expanded efficient frontier. This decision 
creates a negative relation between the net-of-fee Sharpe ratios of equity long/short 
funds and their volatility levels.  
The natural explanation for this diverging evolution between decreasing risk-adjusted 
net returns and increasing fees is voluntary. Because some investors demand high-risk 
portfolios, hedge fund managers who are able to deliver them at the lowest costs have 
no reason to give away more return than they need (i.e., what is necessary to protect 
their position from more constrained asset managers). As in the natural world, the 
finance profession abhors a vacuum: as long as an appetite exists for high-risk 
portfolios, the least constrained managers have incentive to align their net-of-fee 
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returns to what their peers can achieve and keep the surplus for themselves. In this 
sense, aggressive long/short equity fund managers contribute to the completion of 
portfolio offerings on financial markets, and a portion of their fees compensate them 
for this service.  
Obviously, the length of our sample time window indicates that this phenomenon is 
neither new nor short-lived. If one wants to shift the bargaining power to the final 
individual investor, then constraining hedge fund managers to reduce their 
performance and management fees does not appear to be a workable solution. First, 
hedge funds are, by definition, more loosely regulated than mutual funds are; thus, the 
former can achieve higher returns for high risk. Imposing strong limitations on their 
fees would be in total opposition with their raison d’être. Second, this solution would 
be the wrong way to address this problem. The problem is much less about hedge 
funds benefitting from a strong position than about mutual funds suffering from a 
weak one. Our paper emphasizes that preventing a level-playing field for the high-risk 
segment of the asset management spectrum generates inefficiencies and that 
eventually, it is the individual investor who pays for it. Evolving toward a lift of 
constraints imposed on traditional asset managers while still offering strong 
protections to retail investors (e.g., through efficient risk management and more 
transparency) would undoubtedly help enhance the risk-return trade-off for investors, 
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i Brennan (1971) shows that borrowing restrictions lead to the same type of results. Therefore, 
we use differential interest rates for simplicity.	
ii	Note that the individual fund-by-fund regression does not allow us to investigate the 
concavity of the relation between hedge fund Sharpe ratios and volatilities.	
iii	The market volatility variable is removed from the equation because of the introduction of 
fixed effects in the panel regressions.	
 



























Figure 1 – The Capital Market Line (CML) under leverage and short sales 
constraints 
Figure 1 illustrates the Efficient Frontier (EF) and Capital Market Line (CML) for 
constrained long-only investors (respectively the brown and red curves). The green 
line displays the unconstrained long-only (L-O) CML. Finally, the Efficient Frontier 
(EF) and Capital Market Line (CML) for unconstrained long-short investors are 






























































Figure 2 – The Capital Market Curve under partial leverage constraints 
Figure 2 illustrates the Efficient Frontier (EF) and Capital Market Curve (CMC) for 
constrained long-short investors compared to the unconstrained long/short (L/S) 























Figure 3 - Histogram of Sharpe multiplier (standardized) 
 
Figure 3 displays the distribution of the standardized Sharpe multiplier, i.e. T-





Figure 4 - Conditional evolution of Sharpe multiplier on fund volatilities 
 
Figure 4 depicts the evolution of the Sharpe multiplier conditional on fund volatility. 
The coefficient is estimated by Panel regression (1). 	
 
Figure 5 - Histogram of the Sharpe/volatility relationship. 
Figure 5 displays the distribution of the T-statistics of coefficient  !!!  from Fund 
Equation (2).  
 
 
Figure 6 - Conditional evolution of Sharpe/volatility relationship on volatility 
breakpoints 
 
Figure 6 depicts the evolution of coefficient   !!conditional on fund volatility. The 
coefficient is estimated by Panel regression (2). 
 
Figure 7 - Histogram of management fee/volatility relationship 
 
Figure 7 displays the distribution of T-statistics of coefficient   !′!!  from Fund 
Equation (4).  
 
 
Figure 8 - Histogram of performance fee/volatility relationship 
 
Figure 8 displays the distribution of T-statistics of coefficient   !!!  from Fund 






Table 1. Definition of variables !!,! Sharpe ratio of individual fund j computed at time t over the lagged 36 months !!,! Volatility of individual fund j computed at time t over the lagged 36 months !!,! Sharpe ratio of the benchmark computed at time t over the lagged 36 months !!,! Volatility ratio of the benchmark computed at time t over the lagged 36 months 
mfeej,t  Management fee of the individual fund j at time t 




Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the fund variables across time and funds 
 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the fund variables across time and funds 
















 Mean  
(Sign. level) 
Std. Dev. Min. Max. # of observations 
(j,t) !!,! 0.1942** 0.32% -16,79 1,912 111,825 !!,! 0.0074** 0.06% -0,3353 0,3401 364,344 !!,! 4.685%** 3.43% 0 47.22% 111,876 !!,! 4.675%** 0.37% 3.37% 7.95% 364,344 
Mfeej,t  1.45%** 0.50% 1% 2% 54,273 






Table 3. Panel regressions 		 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 	 (8)	 (9)	
Dep.	var.	 !!,! 	 !!,! 	 !!,! 	 	 !"##!,! 	 !"##!,! 	
/Indep.	var.	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	!!,! 	 4.006**	(0.0426)	 3.8591**	(0.0421)	 4.7237**	(0.1018)	 	 	 	!!,! 	 	 -0.0177**	(0.0003)	 -0.0175**	(0.0003)	 	 0.0175**	(0.0011)	 0.0344**	(0.0011)	!!,!1!! !.!%	 	 	 -0.9417**	(0.1010)	 	 	 	
Model	summary	F-stat		(P-value)	 84.08	(0.000)	 88.05	(0.000)	 88.12		(0.000)	 7.09	(0.000)	 51.44	(0.000)	R2	(%)	 60.15	 59.84	 60.18	 17.85	 64.30	Usable	obs.	 111,825	 111,825	 111,821	 54,269	 54,269	Df	 109,885	 109,885	 109,884	 52,330	 52,330	
 
 
Table 3 displays the estimated coefficients for panel regression represented by 
equations (5) to (9). Dep. (resp. Indep) var. stand for “Dependent” and “Independent” 
variables. Volatilities of the parameters are displayed in parentheses. *, ** indicate 
significance at the level of respectively 5% and 1%. Df stands for degrees of freedom, 
obs. for observations. 	
